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# Air Force Update

Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C. 20330-1000

## FY92 Air Force Posture Statement

By  
**Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice**  
**Air Force Chief of Staff General Merrill A. McPeak**

**Presented on**  
**February 26, 1991**

*to the*

**House of Representatives**  
**Armed Services Committee**

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MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE:

At the time this statement was drafted, U.S. forces, in conjunction with forces from allied nations, were engaged in combat in Operation Desert Storm. Although that campaign is still unfolding, the events of the past few months have demonstrated to the nation the importance of airpower in modern conflict. Our Desert Storm forces—from all the Services—are drawing upon over twenty years of investment to provide the nation with the kinds of responsive and flexible capabilities needed to underwrite U.S. national security. Future capabilities will depend, in turn, upon choices made today.

In Operation Desert Shield/Storm, our air forces have proven flexible and responsive—their combat effectiveness the result of a combination of training, readiness, and modern equipment. Stealth, perhaps the most revolutionary set of technologies since the advent of radar and the atomic bomb, has been proven under fire. F-117A aircraft have operated with impunity in contested air space, without the host of support aircraft (air escort, defense suppression, and associated tankers) required by more conventional airframes. For example, F-117As, representing 2.5% of the combat assets, covered approximately 31% of the targets in the Air Tasking Order for the first 24 hours of the air campaign. Precision-guided munitions and stand-off weapons have also proven their merit in destroying critical elements of Iraq's war machine. And General Schwarzkopf's call for more B-52s illustrates the continuing importance and utility of conventional heavy bombers.

We will carefully study the lessons of this war to prepare for the next conflict. So will our potential adversaries. In future, air defenses will likely become more robust and effective; conventional targets more hardened and dispersed. We need to be prepared for the future—to learn from this war, not repeat it.

### GLOBAL REACH—GLOBAL POWER

During hearings held at the same time last year, the Air Force laid out its strategic planning framework for the future. Entitled *Global Reach—Global Power*, this framework capitalizes upon the inherent characteristics of airpower—speed, range, flexibility, precision, and lethality—to help underwrite U.S. national security. Operation Desert Shield/Storm has shown this global reach and global power in action. In its planning for FY92/93, the Air Force followed the *Global Reach—Global Power* framework in applying resources. The President's FY92/93 budget sustains this vision to support U.S. national security for the long term.

Extraordinary international developments over the last few years have created the potential for a significantly different security environment



as we approach the beginning of the 21st Century. These changes do not promise a tranquil world nor an end to threats to American interests around the globe. Soviet policy declarations reflect changes in Soviet intentions, but the ultimate direction of the Soviet Union is far from clear. Many developing nations possess formidable arsenals of growing sophistication, which, as demonstrated recently by events in the Arabian peninsula, can threaten U.S. interests and allies.

In the face of these uncertainties, the fundamental U.S. national security objective remains the preservation of the United States as a free and independent nation. The foundation of our defense strategy is deterrence—deterrence based on a mix of nuclear and conventional forces, strong allies, forward defense, aerospace and maritime superiority, and power projection capabilities. We must continue to deter a Soviet nuclear attack and stabilize the nuclear balance through arms control coupled with prudent modernization. For conventional forces, the focus has shifted to regional contingencies. To contain local and limited wars, we must improve our capabilities to project power—the United States must increasingly emphasize rapid, mobile, and lethal long-range capabilities.

This new world we are rapidly moving into plays to Air Force strengths—rapid, deployable, long-range, flexible, and lethal capabilities, which can deter, provide a tailored response, or punch hard when required. The *Global Reach—Global Power* framework lays out five main objectives and associated forces for the Air Force to deal with this uncertain world:

- *SUSTAIN DETERRENCE*—Nuclear Forces
- *PROVIDE VERSATILE COMBAT FORCE*—Theater Operations and Power Projection
- *SUPPLY RAPID GLOBAL MOBILITY*—Airlift and Tankers
- *CONTROL THE HIGH GROUND*—Space and C3I Systems
- *BUILD U.S. INFLUENCE*—Strengthening Security Partners and Relationships

The process of developing plans to support these objectives was conducted within the constraints of downward trends in defense spending. Continuing concern over the federal deficit has made tighter defense budgets a way of life, forcing the Air Force to make many difficult decisions to provide the full range of capabilities needed in the challenging future. Figure 1 provides a dramatic illustration of the challenge facing the Air Force in the 1990s. By FY97, our purchasing power will have declined 45% from the peak funding year of FY85.




Figure 1—Purchasing Power Cumulative Real Decline  
(in FY92 Constant Dollars)

After several years of dramatic decline, the Air Force's FY92 budget request for \$86.8 billion in total obligational authority (31.1% of the total DoD request) provides a modest real growth over FY91 of 0.8%. The biennial budget also requests \$91.7 billion for FY93, a 1.7% real growth over FY92. These modest increases reflect the need to capitalize upon long-planned investments in order to modernize and retain capabilities in essential mission areas. In subsequent years, Air Force plans respond to continuing downward projections in defense budgets.

To develop the FY92/93 budget, every program was scrutinized from top to bottom for relevance. We analyzed each mission area systematically to re-examine our most important requirements and rethink investment strategies. The results exploit America's aerospace technological edge to ensure maximum combat capabilities for the long term. At the same time, we have ruthlessly pursued efficiency to get the most combat power out of tax payers' dollars.

The Air Force has deliberately chosen to sacrifice size while continuing modernization and preserving readiness—to provide a smaller, but balanced, ready, and sustainable warfighting force. The dramatic reductions are illustrated in Figure 2. The Air Force is reducing active and civilian end-strength and increasing reliance on the Air Reserve Component to the maximum extent possible. We are also substantially cutting our bomber, ICBM, and fighter force structure. To sustain the combat effectiveness of this smaller force and position ourselves for the long-term challenge, we will continue to pursue the most vital modernization programs.






Figure 2—Air Force Budget and Program Trends,  
Percent Changes, 1985-95

### SUSTAIN DETERRENCE—Nuclear Forces

Deterrence of nuclear attack is the cornerstone of U.S. national security. The Soviet Union remains the only nation capable of destroying the United States, and for the foreseeable future the Soviets will retain the capability to deliver thousands of nuclear warheads against our nation. The TRIAD concept remains fundamental. Each leg of the TRIAD possesses unique and complementary characteristics which synergistically provide a retaliatory capability that no adversary could hope to successfully overcome. Air Force objectives in sustaining strategic deterrence are to maintain military sufficiency, flexibility, and stability in the post-START force. We continue scaled-back plans to modernize the two legs of the TRIAD provided by the USAF: bombers and ICBMs.

## The Bomber Force

The USAF's commitment to maintaining a viable long-range bomber force is rooted in the historical experience of long-range bomber development and operations, the bomber's indispensable role in supporting nuclear deterrence, and the unique versatility that makes it a particularly effective weapon for conventional operations and the projection of U.S. power.

The rapid changes to the global security environment have added unprecedented uncertainty to our security planning, increasing the importance of flexibility and adaptability. As we have seen in Operation Desert Storm, when the theater commander needed increased firepower, he called for additional heavy bombers. Understanding the versatility of heavy bombers—in both nuclear and conventional operations—is the key to understanding their utility. The Air Force remains committed to ensuring the long-term viability of the bomber force.

In the nuclear arena, the bomber enhances the stability of the nuclear balance. Its high survivability promises any aggressor that an attack will be met with devastating retaliation, while its relatively slow speed compared to ballistic missiles means that the bomber does not pose a credible first strike threat. Because it can be generated, dispersed, launched under positive control, and then recalled or redirected, the bomber also provides our nation's leaders with a highly flexible means of sending a variety of unmistakable messages to an adversary—messages that can help defuse and stabilize crises.

The United States currently fields two major types of heavy bombers—penetrating bombers and stand-off cruise missile carriers. A balanced combination of penetrating bombers and cruise missile carriers enhances deterrence by complicating the enemy defensive problem and adding targeting flexibility. Cruise missiles have proven to be a valuable complement to the penetrating bomber force; they extend the lives of older bombers no longer capable of penetrating effectively, add mass to the bomber attack by saturating defenses, and are excellent weapons against many fixed targets. The manned penetrating bomber is an extremely efficient, flexible, and effective system. The key to the penetrating bomber's warfighting versatility and efficient weapons delivery is the presence of a crew in the cockpit capable of reacting to situations and making decisions.

Moving to a pure cruise missile force would eliminate the advantages provided by penetrating bombers and introduce new vulnerabilities. Using long-range radars, airborne radar platforms, tankers, and fighters, Soviet air defenses could focus on detecting, tracking, and engaging non-stealthy




Figure 3—The Value of Stealth

cruise missile carriers before they could launch their missiles. Such an approach would not work against a stealthy penetrating bomber. The USAF's highest priority is the acquisition of 75 B-2 bombers, the only stealth aircraft planned for fielding in the 1990s.

The advantages provided by stealth have been proven under fire. Figure 3 shows why such a small percentage of our combat aircraft—the F-117 force—was able to cover such a large proportion of the target base in Desert Storm operations. Stealthy aircraft can penetrate defenses without the range of support assets required by non-stealth airframes—stealth provides more combat capability from a smaller number of assets with less risk to personnel. Stealth also aids in accurate delivery of munitions in combat—the accuracy of stealthy aircraft is not degraded by survivability tactics. And such systems allow us to recapture the element of surprise.



The B-2 will offer stealthier operations than the F-117 and greater payload/range capability than the B-52 or B-1B—the aircraft will provide extraordinary versatility in supporting nuclear deterrence and enhancing our conventional warfighting capabilities. And that is the kind of flexibility we need in our future smaller force structure.

Based on the need to balance reductions across all accounts and stabilize annual B-2 funding within a constrained resource environment, the budget limits annual B-2 investment (procurement and RDT&E) to approximately \$5 billion. This budget funds four aircraft in FY92 and seven aircraft in FY93.

With the B-2 as the backbone of our bomber force, we will continue to upgrade the B-1B fleet and elements of the B-52 force. A defensive avionics recovery plan has been developed for the B-1B. And over the next few months, we will complete follow-on operational test and evaluation for conventional bombing certification of that aircraft. Budgetary pressures require us to accelerate retirement of the B-52G cruise missile carriers, although two squadrons of dedicated conventional B-52Gs will be retained. The B-52H force will transition to a pure cruise missile force, armed with both the Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) and the stealthy Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM). Approximately half of the B-52H force will be upgraded to also support conventional operations, thus increasing their versatility to meet the demands of this uncertain world environment.

## ICBMs

ICBMs make unique contributions to the TRIAD. They are valued for their promptness, reliability, accuracy, low operating cost, connectivity, and availability—while their near 100% alert rate allows the other two legs of the TRIAD to operate at more economical tempos.

Soviet advancements in ICBM accuracy and increased MIRVing led to increasing concern over the survivability of our silo-based ICBM force and the potential for crisis instability. Adding mobility was deemed to be the best method of addressing these problems, which in turn led to the development of the Peacekeeper Rail Garrison (PRG) program, where Peacekeeper missiles would be mounted on trains, and the Small ICBM (SICBM) program, where single warhead missiles would be mounted on Hard Mobile Launchers (HMLs).

Our adjusted ICBM modernization plans reflect the new realities of the post-Cold War era. Mobility comes at a high cost to procure and operate. And potential future arms control talks beyond START are increasingly focusing on reducing or eliminating heavily MIRVed land-based systems such as Peacekeeper and the Soviet SS-18.

These factors have led to a re-evaluation of our missile modernization plans. We intend to validate the PRG basing mode, but will pause



deployment awaiting future developments. Future Peacekeeper missile buys will be terminated. The SICBM program will continue in development—the choice of a silo or mobile basing mode can be made when directions in the strategic balance become clearer. Whether mobile or in silos, the single warhead SICBM will be more stabilizing during periods of crisis than heavily MIRVed ballistic missiles.

Given anticipated START constraints on Soviet ICBMs, reductions in the threat to our missile silos allow longer-term reliance on the Minuteman missile force. Over the next few years we will begin retiring MMIIIs. The MMIII force will be retained and their silos upgraded with new computers and launch control facilities. Depending on START outcomes, we will retain the option to download MMIII to a one warhead configuration in the future.

### **PROVIDE VERSATILE COMBAT FORCES—Theater Operations and Power Projection**

In contrast to fairly stable nuclear deterrent objectives, the focus on regional contingencies will cause more fundamental changes in conventional forces. Our plans for USAF theater/contingency forces will improve our capabilities to project power—to increase lethality and enhance freedom of action. The ability to concentrate force in a responsive manner over great distances is a key attribute of the Air Force. During Operation Desert Shield, for example, an F-15 squadron was in place, ready to fight 7500 miles from its home base, within 38 hours of the deployment order. Five fighter squadrons and a contingent of AWACS aircraft were in place within four days of the order to deploy. The Air Force's ability to project power, as well as readily adapt to changing circumstances and environments, will be increasingly important in the future.

Operation Desert Storm has highlighted the importance of training, readiness, and advanced equipment. Together they have provided a potent warfighting capability—with aircrews ready to do the job right the first time out, and with historically low casualty rates. To continue providing a modern, balanced, and effective fighter force within realistic budget constraints, we plan to significantly reduce our fighter force structure—from 38.5 tactical fighter wings (including reconnaissance assets) to 26.5 wings. This smaller force requires fewer new fighters—F-15 production has ended and F-16 production will be terminated in FY93. To provide the most cost-effective force, we plan an aggressive 15.25/11.25 Active/Air Reserve Component (ARC) mix.

One of the first considerations of a theater commander is control of the air—since the advent of modern airpower, no major conflict has been won without it. Control of the air (air superiority) protects surface forces and provides freedom of action for surface forces and air forces. U.S. forces have come to take air superiority for granted. Our ground forces have not had to operate without air superiority since the early stages of World War



II—and not a single U.S. soldier has been killed by an enemy air attack since 1953. Air superiority is also a question of where control of the air will take place. Since World War II, the United States has enjoyed the ability to control the enemy's airspace as well as our own. But to maintain control of the air into the next century, we need to modernize our air-to-air fighter forces. Two programs—the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) and the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM)—are the keys to maintaining control of the air for the long term.

The ATF marries stealth, advanced avionics, and advanced performance (notably agility and super-sonic cruise) to ensure control of the air—in both our own and enemy airspace—in the 21st Century. In Operation Desert Storm, our fighter forces engaged adversaries equipped with what were, in some cases, equally advanced aircraft—superior training, tactics, and operational art proved to be the edge. Future adversaries will learn from this war and such advantages cannot be counted on to prevail. The ATF, combined with high quality training, will ensure that we maintain that edge for the foreseeable future.

The ATF program fits the Packard Commission acquisition recommendations and provides a model for future programs. The Packard Commission recommended a prototyping strategy for early testing and streamlined acquisition management. In 1986, the ATF entered a 56 month demonstration/validation phase. Since that time, we have tested various hardware and software prototypes, flown four prototype flight demonstration aircraft over 150 hours, met or exceeded radar cross section testing expectations on full scale models of the two prototypes, tested twelve prototype engines over 4000 hours, flown avionics flying labs on over 100 sorties, and tested avionics integration in ground laboratories. In addition, acquisition management follows the new Packard-recommended streamlined chain of authority. The ATF is our highest priority fighter program.

AMRAAM will provide existing and projected fighters with a critical edge in combat. Current radar missiles must be continuously guided to their target by the launch aircraft, which must keep its radar antenna pointed at the target until missile impact. This severely restricts the aircraft's maneuverability and reduces survivability—moreover, only one target can be engaged at a time. With AMRAAM, our pilots will be able to launch a missile at one target, maneuver, engage and launch at another target, and continue maneuvering—all while the missiles are independently homing in on their respective targets. Recent tests of AMRAAM have been very encouraging. The program will continue low rate production in FY92 (1000 missiles) and FY93 (1310 missiles).

An important component in control of the air involves suppressing enemy air defenses (SEAD). To maintain our effectiveness in this crucial area, we will replace the F-4G Wild Weasels with advanced capabilities on the F-16, F-15E, and future stealthy systems. Program difficulties and



budget limits led to cancellation of the Tacit Rainbow defense suppression drone.

In attack operations, airpower's speed, range, and lethality allows rapid shifting of effects, concentrating firepower wherever the joint force commander needs it—from the close battle, across the length and breadth of the theater, to its deepest reaches. In the early days of Operation Desert Storm, our tactical fighters were employed for strategic effect—to reduce the enemy's capability and will to wage war. Our fighters engaged in interdiction operations to delay, disrupt, and destroy enemy surface forces and material and ensure a favorable ground force ratio at the point of contact. We also conducted air attack over the battlefield (close air support and battlefield air interdiction) by providing direct and indirect air support of ground forces.

To sustain these important attack capabilities, we will enhance our existing forces. The F-117A, which proved the promise of stealth technologies in Desert Storm, will be retained. Elements of the F-16 force will be provided with LANTIRN pods for precise night attack. The F-15E, capable of delivering precision-guided munitions (PGMs) at night, will be fully fielded—as these squadrons enter service, all of the F-111s, except the PGM-capable wing of F-111Fs, will be retired. The Air Force's next generation interdiction aircraft, the Advanced Tactical Aircraft (ATA), was to be a variant of the Navy A-12. In light of the A-12's cancellation, the Air Force will consider the Navy A-12 successor and study the potential to adapt the ATF to an air-to-ground role. For close support work, we will retain (and enhance) two squadrons of A-10s and improve Block 30 F-16s to an F/A-16 configuration in place of the cancelled A-16 program.

New munitions—the Sensor Fuzed Weapon and stand-off precision weapons like the AGM-130B—will sharpen the claws of this smaller attack force. Overall, the future attack force will have greatly increased capabilities to deliver weapons precisely and at night. Recce pods will be procured for F-16s to eventually replace the RF-4Cs—such aircraft will not be maintained in separate squadrons, but will be embedded into existing units.

Our heavy bomber forces will be integrated into theater/contingency operations as the USAF transitions from “tactical” airpower and “strategic” airpower to the integrated employment of airpower. One key organizational initiative is the composite wing. Effective airpower employment depends heavily on the close integration of a range of assets—bomb droppers, fighter escort, jamming aircraft, lethal defense suppression aircraft, airborne radar platforms, tankers, airlifters, and the like. Under the composite wing initiative, many of the assets needed to form composite force packages will be located at one base under one commander. This will increase the speed at which we can deploy, significantly reduce C3 problems, and enhance warfighting effectiveness.



## **SUPPLY RAPID GLOBAL MOBILITY—Airlift and Tankers**

As forward forces decline, but global interests remain, mobility will be even more in demand. Strategic mobility lies at the heart of a credible deterrent posture in such an environment—without the capability to project power, there is no conventional deterrent. The Air Force provides two important components of U.S. strategic mobility: airlifters and tankers. Our objectives in the FY92/93 budget request are to enhance U.S. rapid response capabilities and increase interoperability among the Services.

### **Airlift Forces**

To provide mobility for U.S. forces, the nation has historically relied on a balance of the complementary capabilities of the mobility triad: airlift, sealift, and pre-positioning. Each has advantages and disadvantages—we capitalize on each method's virtues to compensate for the others' limitations. Airlift is an ideally suited mobility tool for an environment of uncertainty with widely dispersed potential flashpoints. As Vice Admiral Butcher, DCINTRANS, recently pointed out: "We may not always have the luxury of 161 days to position our forces."

Exhaustive studies over the past decade have produced a single, consistent answer—the C-17 is the right airlift aircraft for the future. These studies call for an airlifter that can fly long ranges and carry outsize cargo, while providing the tactical performance and agility to open up more airfields for global operations. The most recent analysis—the Major Aircraft Review (MAR)—was conducted at the request of Secretary of Defense Cheney. The study looked at a wide array of options in comparison to the C-17 program, including refurbishment of the C-141 force and procurement of other aircraft such as the C-5 or civil transports. Once again, the choice was clear. As Secretary Cheney testified to Congress, the analysis showed: "The C-17 offered the most capability at least cost in every case."

The C-17 combines current technologies to create what is in many respects a revolutionary capability—"direct delivery." Cargo and personnel can be flown from the United States or elsewhere directly to where they are needed. In short, the C-17 combines the advantages of a strategic airlifter like the C-5—speed, range, aerial refueling, and payload (including outsize cargo)—with those of a tactical airlifter like the C-130—survivability, ability to operate on short, unimproved airfields, agility and maneuverability in the air and on the ground, and the ability to employ different methods of airdrop. The C-17 is highly flexible, designed to efficiently meet the nation's airlift needs across the entire range of potential scenarios.

The importance of this flexibility can be seen in looking at the operations the United States has conducted in the past 14 months. In an



airfield constrained environment (like Panama), the C-17 would allow deployment of a Just Cause-sized force in just over half the time. In a relatively unconstrained airfield environment (like Desert Shield), the C-17 would still deliver significantly more power—for example, 12 more fighter squadrons and 2 more brigades in the first 12 days. Desert Storm operations add emphasis to the importance of the C-17's outsize capabilities. When the Army needed several hundred refueling trucks rapidly deployed to support maneuver operations, the Free World had only the C-5 available—the C-17 could have helped pick up that load, *and* could have delivered them directly to wherever they were needed.

The first C-17 aircraft has completed assembly and is being prepared for first flight this summer. This budget funds 6 C-17s in FY92 and 12 in FY93—it also reprofiles the program to stabilize funding and provide a more modest ramp up to production of 18 aircraft per year. The Major Aircraft Review adjusted the program to a goal of 120 aircraft. The C-17 remains the Air Force's highest priority mobility program.

The reduction in the planned buy of C-17s—a decision taken for affordability reasons—requires modernization of our tactical airlift forces to make up for the C-17's intra-theater contribution eliminated by the MAR. The C-130 fleet is aging and elements require replacement. C-130Hs will be procured—these represent an off-the-shelf capability with no development cost. This budget funds 8 aircraft in FY92 and 12 aircraft in FY93.

## Tanker enhancements

Aerial refueling increases the nation's flexibility to respond in a timely manner across the entire spectrum of conflict. Inflight refueling increases the range and ordnance carrying capacity of receivers—demand for refueling has become increasingly important to deployments and combat operations. During the first four months of Operation Desert Shield, tankers flew over 10,000 sorties to offload fuel to almost 19,000 receivers. In the first 25 days of combat operations in Desert Storm, U.S. tanker forces flew almost 7,000 sorties to refuel about 20,000 USAF, Navy, Marine, and allied aircraft.

The KC-135 re-engining program, which provides modified KC-135Rs with a 50% improvement in refueling offload compared to the KC-135A, is continuing, although at a more affordable pace. In an effort to increase tanker efficiency, flexibility, and interoperability, the Air Force is also pursuing a multipoint initiative that expands on the existing KC-10 multipoint program. When refueling fighter aircraft in employment operations, tanker requirements are typically driven by time and distance constraints—within a given refueling orbit, only a certain number of aircraft can cycle through the single refueling point on our current tankers. Additional offload points—known as multipoint capability—can



increase the number of fighters that can be refueled during the available time and increase operational efficiencies.

The multipoint initiative involves both fighters and tankers. The Air Force plans to add wing-tip drogue pods to KC-135R tankers. This will provide multipoint capabilities to a larger portion of our tanker force and reduce interoperability problems when refueling probe-equipped fighters (such as those fielded by the Navy, Marines, and allied nations). During the first 25 days of Desert Storm, for example, USAF tankers refueled about 4,300 Navy and Marine aircraft. Fitting probes to F-15s and F-16s will allow Air Force fighters to take advantage of multipoint tankers (although all of the fighters will retain their boom slots for maximum flexibility).

### **CONTROL THE HIGH GROUND—Space and C3I Systems**

Space is the high ground of the future. Space-based systems offer great military advantage: global coverage, low vulnerability, and autonomous operations. Smaller force levels and access to fewer forward bases will increase dependence on the force multiplying capabilities of space systems. Historically, the Air Force has been the principal provider of space systems for the Defense Department. The Air Force provides the infrastructure, approximately 90% of DoD's space-experienced personnel, and roughly 80% of the DoD space budget. Recent operations in Desert Shield/Storm have illustrated the unprecedented degree to which space systems have become integrated into day-to-day battlefield operations. Our objective in the FY92/93 budget is to provide a balanced level of funding to meet the full range of critical requirements for the long term in communications, warning, surveillance, and navigation.

Space-based communications assets provide for global, secure, and reliable command and control of forces. The Air Force's highest priority space/C3 program is MILSTAR. The program has been restructured to reflect congressional guidance. We have reduced overall costs, eliminated lower priority program features, retained essential capabilities, and increased the system's tactical orientation.

Attack warning systems have been restructured in light of affordability concerns and the decreased likelihood of a massive Soviet attack. The space-based Boost Surveillance and Tracking System (BSTS) program was terminated—in its place, we will sustain the Defense Support Program (DSP) and pursue technology options for a potential follow-on. Continued deployment of a forward line of radars which comprise the North Warning System will provide atmospheric coverage for North America. The Over The Horizon Backscatter (OTH-B) radar system will be mothballed. Should conditions dictate, the OTH-B line could be brought back into service within a few months.

Surveillance systems provide critical information to battle commanders, regardless of conflict location. Air-breathing systems will be



enhanced greatly through the acquisition of the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS), which was recently proven in combat during Desert Storm. And E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) will be upgraded to provide a cost-effective enhancement to this system's proven capabilities. These systems, together with collection assets like the RC-135, constitute a deployable set of "eyes and ears" for the theater commander. The Space-Based Wide Area Surveillance (SBWAS) program has been adjusted to a technology development program.

Space-based navigation systems enhance global deployments of air, land, and sea forces, as well as provide pinpoint weapon systems accuracies. The Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite constellation should be complete in FY93. Troops in the featureless desert, sailors entering unfamiliar waters, and airmen conducting precision strikes have all attested to the critical contribution of this space-based system.

### **BUILDING U.S. INFLUENCE—Strengthening Security Partners and Relationships**

The Air Force provides the capability to enhance security conditions, strengthen security partners, and project U.S. influence, often with limited or no use of U.S. forces. Since the formation of the Air Force, we have conducted over 80 shows of force/presence missions—on every major continent and over every major ocean. Beyond our lethal assets, long-range surveillance aircraft, such as AWACS, Joint STARS, and the RC-135 also provide the means to accomplish national objectives. Packages of surveillance assets are able to deter adversaries by letting them know we are watching their every move. In the 1980s, for example, AWACS have deployed over a dozen times to various troubled regions of the world. In future, Joint STARS and RC-135s can deploy in conjunction with AWACS to provide new avenues for non-lethal deterrence and assistance to allies.

Since 1947 the Air Force has conducted over 120 air movements of national influence—activities with relatively overt geopolitical overtones (the delivery of key materials, the movement of third country forces, and the evacuation of Americans and foreign nationals). When such operations need to be carried out quickly—as they almost always do—Air Force assets will be a key player. Humanitarian operations in response to disasters also play a role in supporting U.S. national security objectives by providing foreign populations with a favorable image of the United States. In indirect fashion, this can play an important role. How often has the Air Force been called upon to perform humanitarian operations? The answer is more often than most would realize—over 360 times since World War II.

Security assistance allows us to influence events and protect national interests in areas where more direct means of intervention are not viable. Air Force training and logistics aid are politically acceptable in many situations where other forms of influence are not welcome—and the commonality of training and systems enhances interoperability and



security interests with allies. Since the 1950s, the Air Force has trained many tens of thousands of foreign pilots and other military students—over 45,000 since 1980. U.S. Air Force aircraft and associated items are widely recognized for their capability (and thus in demand), an impression that will be heightened by the success of Operation Desert Storm. Today, the Air Force share of DoD's Foreign Military Sales program stands at approximately 45%. And the USAF is currently engaged in 200 cooperative scientific and R&D projects across the globe. The Air Force continues to posture itself to support these important avenues in building U.S. influence overseas and supporting the security interests of the U.S. and our allies.

### **CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES**

To operate better and smarter, the Air Force is re-emphasizing efficiency and focusing on the process of continuously improving quality. The common denominator is capability. As we reduce in size, we must maximize capability by protecting quality forces, readiness, modernization, and research and development.

Quality personnel are essential for a smaller force. Active military end strength will decline 71,900 from the FY91 to FY93 budget requests; civilian end strength goes down 38,000 during the same period. An array of management initiatives help us absorb these reductions—we will streamline, de-layer, and reduce overhead across the Air Force. The integration of two major commands—Air Force Systems Command and Air Force Logistics command—will provide seamless life-cycle system management. We will reduce a range of headquarters by 25-30%. We will eliminate 15 of 19 Air Divisions and all Reserve Numbered Air Forces. Savings from these and other efficiencies mean more dollars available for modernization and people programs. And total quality management practices—such as those from the Packard Commission and the ongoing Defense Management Review process—are being implemented throughout the acquisition process to procure and sustain quality weapon systems cheaper and faster.

As the preponderance of cuts come from the active force, we increase the proportion of the Air Reserve Component (ARC) in just about every major mission area (see Figure 4). We will maintain all ARC flags and will continue to modernize ARC forces.

Training improves the quality of our forces. While reductions in the number of aircraft will reduce the flying hour program by 15%, flying hours per aircrew will remain at roughly the same level as today. But fiscal challenges are growing—we face rising costs per flying hour (partially because of fuel costs). Coping with these challenges will be complicated by the fact that approximately 85% of the O&M budget now represents fixed, "must pay" bills.






Figure 4—Air Reserve Participation in Key Mission Areas

Our funding of readiness and sustainability in the mid-1980s paid off in Desert Shield/Storm. Our readiness is at the highest levels ever. But indicators show a reversing trend. Little or no funding for war reserve material (WRM) spares since FY88 is beginning to show an impact. To arrest this trend, we propose to maintain a modest level of investment in WRM—continuing to make trade-offs among our investment and O&M programs to create a balanced capability.

Changes to our infrastructure are tied directly to our plans in other areas. Base closure actions are on track; but the future timing and funding of these actions are key to the successful implementation of our force structure reductions. Military construction (MILCON) for current projects experiences a real decline, while MILCON to support new or additional systems increases. Overseas MILCON stays at minimum levels.

Increasing Air Force concern for the environment is reflected in both policy and commitment of resources. Funding for environmental protection and cleanup approaches \$1 billion per year for both FY92 and FY93—the highest ever.

Gaining the maximum capability from existing forces means drawing upon the force multiplying effects of technology. Despite declining budgets, a robust technological base is essential. In this budget, there is more emphasis on avionics and command, control, and communications technology. Organizationally, we are re-focusing research and development by restructuring Air Force laboratories for greater efficiency.

## CONCLUSIONS

The steps outlined in this budget protect quality forces, readiness, and modernization despite significant fiscal constraints. They do so by reducing force structure, streamlining organizations, decreasing overhead costs, and balancing sustainability. Declining budgets have posed real challenges—and we've had to make tough decisions. We've terminated numerous programs (Peacekeeper, F-16, Tacit Rainbow, ATA, A-16, Mark XV system, BSTS, OTH-B), and reprofiled and restructured many others (PRG, SRAM II/T, B-2, MILSTAR, C-17, and KC-135R, for example). Our objective is to create a smaller force with cutting edge capabilities and top quality people. The FY92/93 budget ensures that the future Air Force will possess capabilities needed to provide global reach and global power—capabilities that are essential to underwrite U.S. national security in an uncertain world.